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Social inquiry begins habitually with the ‘why?’ question. Why did things turn out like that? Why are they ordered in this way? To such brainteasers, social science is expected to provide answers. And responses invariably begin, ‘because …’. A chain of thinking about social causation is thus set in motion and an understanding of the nature of causality remains a prerequisite for the conduct of social research. 

Although it seems barely conceivable that more is to be said on this venerable methodological topic, the paper argues that much of the prevailing epistemological wisdom and research practice sets off on the wrong foot. Causal inferences are made on the basis of and protected by sound research technique. Good design and analysis are regarded as the foundation stones of our ability to begin to postulate, ‘because of this, this and that’. This essay begs to differ, locating our ability to detect causal powers in the process of theory testing and refinement. Theories provide causal explanation and it is only by harnessing research designs that enhance the precision and refine the scope of theories and that social science can begin to make valid, reliable and useful causal inferences.

Such is the seemingly sweeping and perhaps unorthodox conclusion of the paper and this introduction spells out the precise steps towards its substantiation. First, we need to go through the basics. In the opening section of the paper, three longstanding modes of causal explanation are identified: ‘succesionist’, ‘configurational’ and ‘generative’. Each modus operandi is explained, a map is made situating each method within the suburbs of social investigation, and examples of the models at work are given. 

The primary aim of the initial exposition is to compare and contrast these strategies. A pocket sketch is offered here. 

	Sucessionists locate and identify vital causal agents as ‘variables’ or ‘treatments’. Research seeks to observe the association between such variables by means of surveys or experimental trials. Explanation is a matter of distinguishing between associations that are real or direct (as opposed to spurious and indirect) and of providing an estimate of the size and significance of the observed causal influence(s). 
	Configurationists begin with a number of ‘cases’ of a particular family of social phenomenon, which have some similarities and some differences. They locate causal powers in the ‘combination’ of attributes of these cases, with a particular grouping of attributes leading to one outcome and a further grouping linked to another. The goal of research is to unravel the key configurational clusters of properties underpinning the cases and which thus are able to explain variations in outcomes across the family. 
	Generativists, too, begin with measurable patterns and uniformities. It is assumed that these are brought about by the action of some underlying ‘mechanism’. Mechanisms are not variables or attributes and thus not always directly measurable. They are processes describing the human actions that have led to the uniformity. Because they depend on this choice making capacity of individuals and groups, the emergence of social uniformities is always highly conditional. Causal explanation is thus a matter of producing theories of the mechanisms that explain both the presence and absence of the ‘uniformity’. 

The second section of the paper picks and chooses. Although they provide vital data on the way society is patterned our first two strategies never manage to get beyond description. The models, estimates, effect sizes and so on that are provided are always makeshift. They lack staying power and have no status as enduring causal laws because they are always modified by further investigations of the same ilk, which may be fed by previously ‘unconsidered’ variables or attributes. Our supply of such items is limitless, with the consequence that these models and their findings have no capacity for cumulation. Variables are ten-for-a-penny and have no explanatory memory. To be sure the pathways and associations described are always revealing of some interesting dynamic at play in the make up of society. However, the reason why they are compelling, and here we come to a main claim of the paper, is that they depend on tacit use of generative thinking. We are able to make sense of the correlations and configurations uncovered because we already have awareness, as social scientists and citizens, of the kinds of choices and constraints that are unobserved in such causal models but which condition their outward shape. In short, the succesionist and configurational strategies are partial and defective forms of generative inquiry.

The conclusion to the paper returns to the aforementioned resolution. Causal inquiry in social science can be revitalised via a turn from a method-led to a theory-driven approach. Generative explanations go beyond the measurable, namely variables and attributes. The key explanatory tool is the generative mechanism, which is able to elucidate some of the reasoning and resources and restraints that lead to action. Mechanisms, being theoretical tools, have the precious property of abstraction. This brings us to the second key claim of the paper – namely, that it the power of conceptual abstraction that provides investigative memory. It allows research to move from one context to another, one substantive area to another and still allows for leaning and transferability as the same explanatory ideas are tested and retested, shaped and reshaped.  
Three modes of causal explanation

Social science is a broad church and many sects have preferred to follow the ways of deconstruction, critique, emancipation and so on. We leave them to their hearts’ desires here, for we are interested only in those tribes who seek to explain. But even within the no-nonsense ranks of the causal explicators there is adherence to diverse first principles. This section adumbrates three core approaches to causal reasoning. 

A couple of caveats should be inserted briefly, which hopefully will not get in the way of exposition. It must be emphasised that the following is not a technical exposition. Under the spotlight here is an investigative imperative referred to, by Kaplan (1964), as the ‘logic-in-use’ – namely, the reason why the methods are applied in the first place. These logics reveal the key organising principles of the method, which become internalised and perhaps taken for granted, as one becomes proficient in the research technique. There are, of course, many sub-species and sub-sub-species of the following approaches and I do not want to become entangled in their procedural differences. The same goes for the substantive coverage of each approach. Applications of the following strategies rove across social science, pure and applied, micro and macro, historical and contemporaneous. I outline a mere handful of examples here. The point, again, is that what is under inspection is the implicit understanding of causality rather than the specific usage. 
1. Successionist causation: variables and their association

This logic abounds in the heartlands of survey and experimental work. The fundamentals are laid down in sacred texts such as Blalock’s Causal Inferences in Non-experimental Research (1961), Campbell and Stanley’s Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (1963), and Cook and Campbell’s Quasi-Experimentation (1979). It thrives in information rich environments, which produce ‘social indicators’, ‘official records’, ‘scoring systems’, ‘test results’, ‘performance measures’, ‘large data sets’, and above all ‘variables’. 

And it is variables that do the explanatory work under this model. The first move is to identity a variable that captures the ‘outcome’ or ‘output’ or ‘result’ or ‘effect’ that needs to be explained. This is known universally as the ‘dependent variable’. Explanation is conceived in terms of locating the causal powers of other variables known as ‘independent variables’. These explanatory variables are regarded as having the raw potential to impact on other variables – a parent’s education can transfer its influence across to a child’s education. The basic terminology has become taken for granted but is, in itself, most instructive. ‘Variables’, it goes without saying, come in different amounts, and the more of the stuff there is, the bigger the potential push. A change in the independent variable (X) is thus said to ‘bring about’ change in the dependent variable (Y), a uniformity depicted by the ubiquitous causal arrow as in figure 1. Such regularities or associations or correlations thus provide the basic building blocks of explanation.

Figure 1: The omnipresent causal arrow
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However, as even the beginner knows, ‘correlation does not equal causation’, and so more work has to be done under this strategy to strengthen the causal inference. Knowing that X is associated with Y does not provide strong explanatory lessons in a world in a world where the same can be said of many different variables (XN). If one thinks again of a variable like one’s ‘educational attainment’, then it is stunningly obvious that any number of life’s occurrences and events may have shaped it. Accordingly, the basic goal of the succesionist strategy lies in unravelling models of multiple-causation (as in figure 2). The aim, however, is avoid the woolly conclusion that ‘everything causes everything’ and to go in search of the really significant influences. 

Simplifying drastically, one can say that the search for such vital causes is managed in two ways. The first is to isolate the critical causal condition by experimental manipulation. This is depicted in the second part of figure 2 in which the influence of one variable on another is isolated from all potential ‘confounding’ variables. If the explanatory variable is open to manipulation, as for instance when it is embodied in a ‘treatment’ or ‘programme’, it is possible to approximate to such a closed system. This is achieved by randomly assigning subjects to experimental and control groups, and applying the treatment only the former. Since the groups have an identical make up, the only influence at work, the only cause that differentiates the conditions, is the application of the treatment (X1), with other potential influences (X2, X3, X4, etc.) being held in control. The unadulterated influence of X1 on Y can thus be observed and measured directly.

































The second strategy for dealing with multiple-causation uses a similar logic but achieves ‘control’ by statistical means. Variables are designed to capture any number of traits and properties and in most social situations it is impossible to manipulate their presence or absence. The best we can do is to observe and then work out the causal infrastructure post hoc. This is illustrated in the lower visual within figure 2. Survey research can dredge up with any number of potential associations (X1) with a dependent variable (Y). To test the veracity and power of any particular relationship we make further observations on a ‘test variable’ (X2) in order to see if the initial pattern of influence changes. For instance, a relationship could be discovered between the number of bedrooms in a child’s home (X1) and the their educational attainment (Y). Before leaping to conclusions about education’s crucial dormative roots, it might be wise to take into account the causal powers of another variable measuring parental socio-economic status (X2).  Strong associations are discovered between it and both dwelling magnitude and offspring’s educational attainment, leading to a preference for a model positing the vital causal pathways as emanating from the parental contribution. 

The quasi-experimental and casual modelling traditions in social research build on these strategies. Variables do the explanatory work. Causal complexity is managed via the progressive addition of larger and larger subsets of variables. Data collection is a matter of creating measurement tools and designing fieldwork opportunities to capture the variables, their change and sequence. Data analysis is a matter of finding the efficacious permutations of array upon array of variables, which order significant tracts of the social world. To provide a little more verisimilitude to this basic account, it is worth examining the findings of a couple of contemporary pieces of such causal analysis. 

Our first example, Grossman and Tierney (1998), uses the ‘gold standard’, a randomised trial, to assess the causal efficacy of a mentoring programme, the revered 
US Big Brothers Big Sisters programme. This is the best known study of such interventions and it takes some of the responsibility for the popularity of mentoring programmes for youth thanks to its positive conclusion:

Taken together, the results presented here show that having a Big Brother or a Big Sister offers tangible benefits for youth. At the conclusion of the 18 month study period, we found that Little Brothers and Little Sisters were less likely to have started using drugs or taking alcohol, felt more competent about doing school work, attended school more, got better grades, and have better relationships with their parents and peers than they would have if they had not participated in the programme.

Here then is a powerful causal claim – all this is the doing of the intervention. Moreover, its methodological credentials may be seen as impeccable, as the research strategy employed is a ‘field’ version of a randomised controlled trial. BBBS is a established, nationwide programme. It is thus big enough to sustain a large sample of would-be mentees and popular enough, moreover, to utilise ‘waiting-list controls’. That is to say the core comparison above is based on 959 volunteers for the programme who are split into an experimental group and a ‘waiting list’ control. The outcome referred to above thus relate to the improvement in a cross section of behaviours as compared between the two groups. Data on changing behaviour is measured using the classic pre-test, post-test design. Rather more controversially, these are measured during telephone surveys, so the improvements quoted above refer to self-reported data.

The causal logic driving the design here takes care of a potential confounding influence, the so called the ‘selection’ or ‘volunteer’ effect. Because randomisation occurs after mentees have applied for enrolment on the scheme, they can all be considered equally well disposed to it. Hence, according to the authors, the remorseless logic of experimentation can be applied – ‘the only systematic difference between the groups was that the treatment youths had the opportunity to be matched with a Big Brother or Big Sister’. It is not, incidentally, quite clear what goes on in the limbo of the waiting-list but this I leave to another paper (Pawson 2008). 

Let us now review the impact data. The intervention aims for a whole range of changes from anti-social to pro-social behaviours. The report provides too much detail to be easily summarised here, but there is pattern of generally positive results across a range of behaviours as claimed in the quotation above. But there is fluctuation, of course. For instance, in terms of the crop of dependent variables measuring ‘antisocial behaviour’, the programme generates significant reductions in the commencement of ‘smoking’ and ‘drug’ usage, and in the levels of ‘hitting’. However, no effect is found for ‘stealing’ or ‘damage to property’. Significant impact differentials are also reported for subgroups (minority/white, male/female). MORE DETAILED EXAMPLES? EDUCATED GUESS IN HERE. FLUCTATIONS

What we have here is a fairly typical example of a field experiment, both in execution and the texture of the findings.. So called pre-test, post-test, one control group designs are heroically difficult to mount and tend to be somewhat rough at the edges on such matters as maintaining control over the allocation to the two conditions and on the reliability of the before and after measures. Despite these inevitable imperfections, this is as close as we can get to manipulating the social world in order to observe the impact on one variable on another, with all other variable under control (as in figure two). We return, in the second part of the paper, to a closer analysis of the integrity of the causal logic applied here and of the durability of the findings. 

Here, it is necessary to complete the story of successionist analysis, by exploring its other strand – the one employing multivariate analysis. Variables are still considered the vital causal agents. But the idea in this formulation is to count them in, rather than cancel them out. To provide continuity between examples, we examine a further paper (Rhodes et al, 2000) on the same BBBS mentoring programme, with the causal analysis being refocused as follows. Attention is drawn to the sequence of changes in programme outputs and outcomes, a feature rather nicely captured in the title: ‘Agents of change: pathways through which mentoring relationships influence adolescents’ academic adjustment’. 

A large sample of mentees who had completed the programme were asked to report on a range of potential changes in their attitudes and behaviours. These were captured as variables, their content indicated by the (almost) self-explanatory labels reproduced in Figure 3. What the model attempts to do indicate which of these intermediate changes is direct or indirect, and give a weighting to the strength of that influence. For instance, according to this model (upper portion), mentoring does not influence grades directly but only by building a youth’s perception of his or her scholastic competence, which platform then goes on to influence actual school performance. Perhaps rather less obviously, mentees who report a variety of educational gains (they value school more, they skip less, they consider themselves to be improving) tend to be the ones who also report improved relationships at home.

As can be seen, these illustrations add more depth to the causal account – intervening variables, mediators, sub-group differences, multiple outcomes. Had we space for further exploration, coverage could be given to the treatment of residual variables, multiple measures, measurement error, interaction effects, non-linear effects, multi-level analysis and so on. The point, however, is that the core logic remains unchanged. Causal regularities are hypothesised, data on a set of apposite variables is gathered to explore this regularity and according to the analysis the conjectured uniformity is further explained or explained away.
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Before we depart this first interpretation of causality, one further and seemingly elementary detail might be raised. How are the candidate variables chosen? According to the formal philosophies that are said to underpin this model, there is no master plan. Under a strict positivism (Hume 1997/1748) causes are not real; we cannot observe them and they should be consigned to the metaphysical dustbin. Rather we make causal inferences based on the things we can observe, namely objects and their properties and their mutual occurrence. Empiricist reasoning is austerity itself – there is no reason to presuppose that one variable rather than another will have explanatory power and thus all inquiry is a matter of fortuitous, if painstaking, trial and error. 

In practice, experimentalist and modellers operate a rather more generous logic-in-use. That is to say, hypothesis building and corroboration are regarded as more than mere happenstance. Treatments are thought worthy of investigation because there is reason to believe that they may work. BBBS is thus chosen for evaluation precisely because of its longevity and popularity with policy makers and the public. Variables enter the frame in surveys because of the researcher’s nous and experience. In many learning encounters as above, we expect self-confidence to blossom before it turns into aptitude and effort, and this idea is put to the test. Models are accepted not merely by statistical fit but also because of some sense making process. Rhodes, for example, follows fashion in this respect, offering a few words of justification in respect of a pathway highlighted in figure 3: ‘if parents feel involved in, as opposed to supplanted by the provision of additional adult support, they are likely to reinforce mentors’ positive influences’. 

There is then a residual role for ‘theory’ in variable analysis and its form and function are worth pinning down. On this model, theories carry the two roles of insight and affirmation. At the beginning of inquiry, the researcher scans the horizon for potential dependent and independent variables – ‘we might reasonably expect the following to play a part here’. At the close of investigation there is a light brush of verbal justification for the patterns and sequence of variables described in the model – ‘what we have discovered here makes sense’. But that is as far as it goes, because the propositional structure of theories remains the X-leads-to-Y statement. Theories begin as common sense hunches about such sequences and become more closely specified hunches as a result of the research. Theories, in short, are causal arrows. And they remain causal arrows.
2. Configurational causation: attributes and their combination

We are still in the midst of our account of the basics of causal reasoning and I turn now to a codification of a quite different logic. It has long and rather diverse intellectual roots, some of the basic ideas being set down in 1879 in John Stuart Mill’s, System of Logic (1970/1879). Further development of the model took place in the hands of historical sociology, using a predominately narrative method (Skocpol, 1984). Much recent interest and energy have been directed towards this second model, and under the influence of Ragin (1987), it is increasingly part of the repertoire of numerically oriented researchers. In technical terms, it is sometimes heralded as a change from a variable-based to a case-based methodology.

The basic atom of inquiry is often referred to as the ‘attribute’ or ‘condition’. Again the terminology is instructive, for these attributes have the causal powers to condition what follows, just as we might say that weather conditions influence the style of rugby that can be played, or that market conditions shape the number of people willing to invest. Attributes also have the property of being of identifiable, observable bits of the social world about which it possible to collect data. Such creatures might thus sound suspiciously like ‘variables’, the crucial difference being that these items are regarded as features of larger systems. They are parts of a whole. Here lies the difference with old style variables, which are regarded as entities in their own right – they are ‘independent’ variables after all.

This leads us to the heart of the causal imagery. Society is organised into systems, and what allows for and produces change is the particular configuration of attributes within the system. It is the combination of attributes, the fact that happen together, which provides the trigger for system transformation. Variable analysis seeks to unearth the contribution of individual causes. Configurational analysis tries to follow the consequences of their combination.

Though often regarded as a sparkling new rivulet, configurational thinking actually runs deep. For instance, in classic comparative-historical sociology (e.g. Moore, 1966), this format is used intuitively. Moore explains, for example, that Britain’s early industrialisation was encouraged by a range of coterminous conditions – namely, (a) weak aristocracy, (b) colonial empire to exploit, (c) technological advance, (d) strength of the commercial middle classes, (e) displaced cheap labour, and so on. It must be acknowledged that the identification of the key causal attributes is nowhere near as blunt as this under Moore’s pen and indeed the attributional chain can be somewhat lost in his historical narrative. But what is unmistakable is the basis causal logic, which is portrayed in Figure 4. 

Any one of these items alone is unlikely to be able to trigger a change to industrial production but taken together, they provide a powerful impetus. For instance, technological advance (c) in the form of mechanical looms, spinning-jennies and the rest will not encourage large scale production unless there is a cheap labour (e) to run them, and a market (b) to exploit for raw materials and sales. Recognition of the need for alignment of product, production and market remains at the core of manufacture today – someone at Apple has pulled off the triplet for the iPod. In terms of Moore’s historical challenge, the three facets are but a segment of a larger configuration. Yet more conditions need to be called in to explain a thoroughgoing transformation to industrialisation. Whilst we have still to come to the method that allows us to recognise these condition, a first principle of configurational causation is now identified, namely that is the ‘attribute set’ that leads to the outcome.











Another useful explication of the philosophical roots of the method comes from Ragin (1987:25), who does further service in clarifying the idea of combination or intersection of conditions: 

‘Whenever social scientists examine large-scale change (such as the collapse of a polity, the emergence of an ethnic political party, or the rapid decline in support for a regime), they find that it is usually combinations of conditions that produce change. This is not the same as arguing that change results from many variables, as in the statement “both X1 and X2 affect Y” because this latter type of argument asserts that change in either causal variable causes a change in Y, the dependent variable. When a causal argument cites a combination of conditions, it is concerned with their intersection. It is the intersection of a set of conditions in time and space that produces many of the large scale qualitative changes … that interest social scientists, not the separate of independent effects of these conditions. Such processes exhibit what John Stuart Mill called “chemical causation”. The basic idea is that a phenomenon or change emerges from the intersection of appropriate pre-conditions – the right ingredients for change.  In the absence of any one of the essential ingredients, the phenomenon – or the change – does not occur. This conjunctural or combinatorial nature is a key feature of causal complexity.’ 

Before we can see how this causal imagery is turned into a working research strategy, it is necessary to clarify the notion of a ‘case’.  Blood, sweat and tears have been shed in trying to pin down the nature of cases and of case study research (Ragin and Becker, 1992), the problem being that individuals, organisations, societies, policies, events, and so on and so on, can all be ‘cases’. What really counts is the analytic framework behind the inquiry, which will identify members of a set of comparable phenomena. Configurational research begins with the creation a family of equivalent (but not identical cases) and understanding the consequences of their similarities and differences becomes the modus operandi of the method.

Accordingly, cases are not ‘given’ but are selected – and the selection process is an integral part of the method (and of its strengths and weaknesses). For instance, and to go back to the previous example, if the research focused on the question of why Britain was first to industrialise, then a selection of its immediate contemporaries, say Germany and France, might provide useful comparators. If the question is about forms of industrialisation, then later industrialisers, like USA and Japan, might form fruitful comparative cases.

Causal analysis, as such, begins with the permutation of cases and their attributes.  A neat example is to hand, borrowing one of Ragin’s standard illustrations (1994: 117) as in Figure 5. Here, we imagine the researcher examining eight historical cases from the early 1980s (first column) in which a government has turned to repressive, violent tactics in response to popular protests (final column). Some relevant aspects of the ‘histories’ of each nation are represented in binary fashion along the rows: namely,  whether the country was: aligned to the United States (1) or the Soviet Union (0), whether it was industrialised (1) or not (0), whether it had a democratic government prior to the protest (1) or not (0), and whether it had a strong military in place (1) or not (0). 

Figure 5: Hypothetical example of the configurational method









Source: adapted from Ragin (1994: 117)

The goal of the analysis is to figure out which of these conditions stands in a causal relationship to outbreak of violent crackdowns. Reading along the columns, we see that each individual history is different. Violent regimes do not share any single common condition or any particular combination of conditions. Ragin’s point, however, is that the data is strongly patterned. Viewed with an eye on similarities and differences, we see that two dramtically contrasting combinations are associated with violent repression, namely:
i)	If the country has an undemocratic government (0) AND a strong military (1), as in cases #1 to #4
ii)	If the country has a democratic government (1) AND is not industrialised (2). as in cases #5 to #8

Figure 5, of course, is a text book fiction, designed for teaching purposes. Rows and columns are arranged so that the vital configurations hit the eyeball, initial conditions are shrunk to a simple binary divide, not all potentially significant conditions (e.g. urbanisation) are included in the data, and so on. We return to some of these specifics in a second. The point to be emphasised at this juncture, however, is that through such illustrations a fresh causal logic is established, departing significantly from the first model, and having the following characteristics:
	configurations (or the intersection of prior conditions) carry the explanation
	dissimilar configurations may lead to the same outcome 
	similar configurations may lead to different outcomes
	individual conditions may contribute to outcomes in opposite ways

This overall causal imagery has by now been transformed into a working method, variously known as qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), Boolean method, ‘small n’ analysis. A brief outline of the four basic steps is offered, for the beginner, borrowing again from an example of Ragin’s of a researcher using the method in seeking an explanation for the diverse uptake of ‘tracking’ (streaming) in elementary schools in different districts in the US. 

Stage one - hypothesise and select out potential conditions that may have lead to the outcome under investigation. These emanate from the researcher’s hunches, experience, existing literature and so on. In Ragin’s illustration, four factors are chosen on the following grounds. a) Whether there is racial diversity or not. This enters the picture because ‘whites in racially diverse generally believe that tracking will benefit their children most’. b) Whether there is class diversity or not. The rationale here is similar, with the dominant group, seeking to retain the advantage of streaming for their offspring. c) Whether there are competitive school board elections or not. Open elections are important because ‘the majority of voters usually disapprove of tracking in elementary schools’. d) Whether or not the teachers are unionised. ‘Unionisation is included because the researcher believes that the teacher unions prefer tracking because it simplifies teaching’. 

Stage two – assemble data (through primary or secondary means) and locate it on a data matrix. A sample of school districts is selected obtaining, of course, districts that have chosen and not chosen to track. Data is collected on the potential explanatory factors and these are simplified so that each cell entry can be entered in binary fashion in the matrix (e.g. 1 for unionised teachers, 0 non-unionised). The assembled matrix, known as a ‘truth table’, takes the same outward form as Figure 6. One difference is that certain combinations of conditions and outcomes are likely to crop up more that once. The frequency of identical configurations is thus a matter of record in the truth table, whilst the information that case #1 belongs to ‘Greenville’, whilst case #2 refers to ‘Orange County’ becomes redundant. More clarification? Outcomes can be both positive and negative. Investigation can cover large number of districts and that some combinations can crop up more that once. Another diagram? 

Stage three – simplify the ‘truth table’ to reveal the most significant causal configurations. With 4 causal conditions, the truth table could, arithmetically speaking, contain 24 = 16 different row combinations. Add more potential conditions and configurational thinking develops exponentially. Not all combinations are observed in practice, however, and some feature more than once. The first step in analysis is simply to list the ‘actually observed’ patterns, though these are still considered to reveal partial and local contingencies. ‘Simplification’ involves getting to the core causal configurations using analytic rules such as the following: ‘If two rows of a truth table differ in only one causal condition yet result in the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two rows can be considered irrelevant.’ For instance, such a simplification is possible if we observed the following two configurations associated with tracking (‘UPPER CASE’ indicates the presence of the attribute, ‘lower case’ its absence):
TRACKING = RACE.CLASS.elections.unions
TRACKING = RACE.CLASS.elections.UNIONS
The presence or absence of teacher unions seems to make no difference to the particular class of situations, where the decisive contributions are best expressed:
TRACKING = RACE.CLASS.elections
Thus the data speaks – in situations of race or class diversity and where elections to school boards are not open, tracking is more likely.

Stage four – deciding on the core configurations and interpreting the results. Further strategies for the simplification and minimisation continue to be applied leading to a reduction in the causal configurations that can be extracted from the data. The exercise does not end mechanically however, for at least two further steps are needed to complete the research cycle. The first is a judgement about parsimony. How many and precisely which simplifications are required to capture the causal dynamics within a set of cases? The method will always reveal patterns (especially if the number of attributes is large) and a call has to be made on whether the explanations are analytically significant and separate. This in turn depends on the ‘interpretability’ of the result. Does a particular configuration actually make sense? For instance, what does the term TRACKING = RACE.CLASS.elections signify? The analysis might conclude by colouring in the picture. If we have an elementary school located in an area of mixed race and social class, the dominant groups may want to preserve their position for their children via a streaming system in schools. This scenario only comes about where they can control school elections, in which circumstances minority and oppositional opinion struggles for a voice. The causal nexus is conditional, as is de rigueur under configurational causation. It also makes a degree of sense, dominant groups preserve their dominance through organisational fixes.

Ragin and others have gone on to develop the method, dealing with technical limitations about, for instance, the need for data in the form of binary classifications.  Much more formal steel has been supplied using a range of computational methods based on Boolean algebra and fuzzy-set theory (Smithson and Verklun, 2006)). All such details are omitted here. As noted, the function of the present account is to ascertain how the causal substratum is envisaged. 

Before leaving this second model of causal analysis, it is useful to undertake another tiny perambulation recapping the nature and role on ‘theory’ on this account. As charted above, theory makes an appearance at stages one and four and the result of this inspection looks surprisingly familiar. That is to say, just as in the successionist model, theories basically carry the two roles of insight and affirmation. Theories begin as common sense hunches about the attributes that might contribute to an outcome and then, hopefully, become more sophisticated afterthoughts able to account for the complex interplay of attributes. Theory assembles the candidate conditions. Method sorts out which combinations are important. Theory makes sense of the resulting configuration.
3. Generative causation: mechanisms, contexts and their outcomes

Let us begin by locating the generative model on the map of social science and finding out who put it there. First, there is a tradition, termed ‘realism’ or ‘critical realism’, rather philosophical in orientation, that has established a powerful causal ontology that sits foursquare between relativism and empiricism (Bhaskar (1978, 1979), Archer (1995), Bhaskar et al (1998), Pawson, (1987), Lawson (date), Sayer (2000), Collier (date). Then there is a school of sociology, much more closely wedded to empirical research, and conducting inquiry under the headings ‘analytic sociology’ or ‘generative modelling’ (Boudon, 1974, 1979, 1998), Elster (1989), Fararo (1989) Hedström (2005), Cherkaoui (2005)). Finally, in a corner of the research world well known to the author, there is another ‘realist’ or ‘realistic’ tradition in policy and programme evaluation (Pawson and Tilley (1997), Mark et al (2000), Pawson 2006). 

The aforementioned might appear a rather motley crew and have sometimes acted to secure that reputation. But what brings them together solidly is an understanding of causality. We commence with an attempt to depict the core logic in Figure 6, which is drawn specifically to draw out a contrast with figures 1, 2 and 5. 















Outcomes. Let us start with the explanandum, that which is to be explained, and which is designated the ‘outcome pattern’ in the diagram. At face value, we are on common ground here, for that which is to be explained are the regularities, uniformities, and outcomes which are the stock in trade of evidence in social research. Tracing back over previous examples, this might include the association between a child’s home background and her educational attainment, the influence of mentoring programmes on school attendance, or the regularity whereby countries with undemocratic governments and strong militaries engage in violent crackdowns of political protest, or the pattern in which tracking in schools occurs with the conjunction of racial and class diversity and the absence of open elections to school governerships.

The crucial difference is that, under generative explanation, the goal is to explain what brings about the relationship as described. The causal explanation provides an account of why the regularity turns out as it does. The causal explanation, in other words, is not a matter of one element (X), or a combination of elements (X1.X2) asserting influence on another (Y), rather it is the association as a whole that is explained. Accordingly, Figure 6 removes the ubiquitous causal arrow and replaces it with the dumbbell shape representing the tie or link between a set of variables. 

The logic here turns on its head the impulse to look for causes by gathering data on empirical regularities and repeat occurrences – for the simple reason that these tendencies have the habit of not repeating themselves. Children from poor homes can and do succeed in education. Mentoring programmes sometime work and sometimes don’t, and mostly do a bit of both. Undemocratic, militaristic regimes are sometimes tamed, as is their tendency to repress. There are always exceptions to the rule. What causes something to happen has nothing to do with the number of times we observe it happening.

Accordingly, generative research looks elsewhere for causal powers. But before we follow, it is necessary to rework the role for empirical associations on this account. A useful beginning is to rename them. Lawson (1997) calls them ‘demi-regularities’ to emphasise this badly-behaved, now-you-see-them-now-you-don’t quality. I have preferred the term ‘outcome pattern’ in figure 6. This accepts Lawson’s challenge that causal explanation has to cover both the outcome norm and its exceptions. But an outcome is also a ‘pattern’ in a further sense that it can go beyond the correlation of two variables. Recall in this respect that the successionist model recognises that that there might be intervening variables in causal chains. Recall in this respect that configurational explanations seek causation via a number of combined attributes that together bring about a outcome. Whilst neither of these models are generative accounts (in that the explanation is still located in the variables and attributes) they do give rise to the possibility that the outcomes worthy of explanations may be complex. Outcome patterns are thus the object of explanation is generative social research; they are what triggers inquiry. They may take the form of a simple correlation but they also describe more complex sequences, comparisons, trends and interrelationships. 

Mechanisms. Let us now tackle the second feature. ‘Mechanisms’ are what gives this strategy its unique character. Other phrases, namely – ‘generative mechanisms’ or ‘underlying mechanisms’ are also useful initial metaphors, since they captures the idea that we often explain by going beneath the surface of objects to explain their ‘inner workings’. We cannot understand the working of a clock by examining its face and hands, rather we need to know about clockworks (balanced springs or, nowadays, oscillating caesium atoms). 

Mechanisms explain why outcomes patterns turn out as they do. This is shown diagramatically in figure 6. The mechanism does the explanation. It becomes the causal arrow. And what it explains is the uniformity under investigation. It explains how the outcome pattern is generated. It explains the overall shape of the outcome pattern and thus the causal arrow penetrates, as it where, to its core. 

The outcome pattern is thus seen as a part of a wider system and the causal explanation turns on ‘what it about that system’ that creates its demi-regularities. Causal powers are, therefore, understood as ‘potentials’ or ‘processes’ inherent in the system studied. This is a familiar enough starting point in, say, physical or biopharmaceutical science. We explain the outward properties (pressure, volume, temperature and their interrelationship) of gases using a kinetic theory describing the motion of their inner molecular components. The causal powers of medical treatments reside at the physiological level, being located in what is universally termed the drug’s ‘mechanism of action’. An active ingredient is manufactured, allowing medication to attack viruses, kill cancerous cells, relax blood vessels, heal bacterial infections, boost immune systems and so on. The application of drug X to cure disease Y works through the action of one of these underlying mechanisms.

What then constitute the inner workings or active ingredients or underlying processes that explain social outcomes? There is nothing mysterious to relay here. People make things happen. Their choices determine outcome patterns. Such choices are not free, of course. Wishes come true only if backed by adequate resources; there needs to be capacity and contrivance behind the choice. Furthermore, of the potential options open, a number of them will be viable, others will be heavily constrained, some mere wishful thinking. Furthermore still, in most instances it takes many people to make things happen, so the processes in which we are interested are usually collective choices about which there is disagreement. All in all then, it is capacitated, constrained, collective, contested choices that constitute the basic mechanisms of social explanation. When it comes to substantive examples, I will add more flesh but, at first base, these are the abstract, bare bones of causal mechanisms in social explanation.

In everyday explanation, mechanism thinking is as comfortable as a pair of baggy old socks but for some reason social research has tried to walk on higher heels. If we want to explain why the Shuttleworths went to Palma Nova for their holidays, we find out it was because they’d thought of Florida but couldn’t afford it, had consider inexpensive Romania but were worried about being understood, that Arnold preferred Bridlington but was outvoted by Mavis, Danny and Cheryl, and so on. A poorly resourced, heavily constrained, initially contested and then collective choice wins the day. 

We now have two planks of generative explanation in place. Social research begins with outcome patterns and puzzles. Explanation begins with hypotheses about choices and reasoning. What of the third?

Contexts. The final element of generative explanation is the notion of context. The context is very much the partner concept of the mechanism. Although people choose, they don’t choose the choices open to them. Causal relationships only occur when a generative mechanism triggers. Discovering the explanatory mechanism in action, however, is only half the battle because the connection between its operation and the occurrence of the intended outcome is not fixed. Rather, outcome patterns are also contingent on context. This is depicted in the third feature of figure 6. Rendered into words, this indicates that well resourced choices only come to fruition in efficacious contexts (the enveloping oval). Life’s decisions, however, are made against backdrops good, bad and ugly. And this is why an understanding of context is necessary to explain why outcomes become planned, thwarted and confused. Contexts act as the odds-maker in generative explanation.

Context’s role in causal explanation is now hopefully clearer – but what of context’s form? Thinking of classic agency-structure dualism in social explanation is a useful first image. Context is to structure as mechanism is to agency. Contexts are the pre-existing institutional, organisational and social conditions that sometimes enable and sometimes constrain people’s choices. Thinking of the Shuttleworths is also helpful. You may have guessed without me saying, that they come from Yorkshire, are working class, and have two school-age children whose friends have previously enjoyed Disneyworld. All of these contextual features, too, prefigured and coloured the eventual decision to go to Majorca. ‘Context’, it seems, may cover rather a lot of ground and it is useful to think of it as layered, moving outward in concentric circles as in figure 7. 

















This figure tries to indicate some of the ways in which the outcomes of decision making are fashioned by conditions which pre-exist the moment of choice. Context can be relatively micro or macro and, for purposes of illustration, these are depicted as four ovals representing the shaping force of individual, interpersonal, institutional and infrastructural circumstances. Consider our prisoner pondering the benefits of education and contemplating going straight. The chances of this happening differ according to: i) his prior criminal and education record, and how they mark the ‘distance to be travelled’ to rehabilitation ii) his relationships with education staff, prison staff and family and the strength of the platform they provide iii) the broader prison regime and its relative concern for rehabilitation or confinement or punishment iv) wider social and labour market conditions and the varied reception they afford to ex-cons.

Too much should not be read into any particular example, for what counts as context will depend on the substantive problem under scrutiny. If we interested in a collective, national urge to shift to industrial production then the relevant contexts are, of course, up there at the state level in terms of population characteristics and densities, power and political structures, and indeed the ‘world system’ dynamics of international dependencies and alliances. A contrario, micro decisions studied in ethnomethodology about how people organise turn taking in conversation depend on rather immediate contexts – who and how many people are in earshot and the topic, function, and location of the conversation.

As a final speck of housekeeping on the role of context in causal explanation, it is worth recalling two, now standard, bits of sociological wisdom. The first is to make it clear that contexts enable as well as constrain (Giddens, 1984). In the example of the institutional context of a prisoner education programme, we might find a clash of institutional cultures with the rehabilitative thrust of education and probation services being blunted by the warehousing and punishment climate of the main regime. In relation to all the other examples just listed, they are not intended to refer to a single context or circumstance – in the sense of one person, one location, one population. Rather the reference is to a class of contexts or circumstances. And from that same set it is expected that some contexts enable and some constrain the action of the mechanism. Part of the task of causal explanation is to sort out which is which. The second clarification captures the transformation over time (morphogenisis) of mechanisms and contexts (Archer, 1995). Whilst these are equal partners in generative explanation, the relation between the two is not fixed. There isn’t a list of features out there in the social world of which the researcher can say: these are the contexts and these are the mechanisms. Choices acted on repeatedly by one cohort harden into institutional expectations facing the next. Mechanisms, fired continually, turn into contexts. Part of the task of causal explanation is to fix the time frame of investigation.

Having described the ingredients, we are now in a position to bring together the recipe for generative causation. Causal explanation are propositions. The propositions explain by showing that a mechanism (M) acting in context (C) will generate outcome (O). These CMO propositions are the starting point and end product of investigation. Research commences with hypotheses attempting to explain a puzzling outcome pattern by postulating how its contours might be explained by the constrained choices which have operated within a substratum of contexts. Empirical inquiry will then go on to fine tune the understanding of the precise operation and scope of the Cs, Ms and Os. Causal explanation builds under such an incremental process of revision.

It is high time to move to some empirical examples. A diverse range of applications could be chosen from sources cited in the preamble to this section. One noteworthy tack here is the attempt to unearth a hard core of generative thinking in classic writings of Tocqueville, Durkheim and Weber (Boudon, 2005; Cherkaoui, 2005). But, in order to strike a more immediate contrast with the previous sections my examples are, respectively, youthful and middle-aged.

The first instance is taken from Duguid and Pawson’s (1998) evaluation of a higher education course in Canadian federal prisons. The research begins with a classic causal puzzle – can such a programme reduce the persistently high rates of re-entry to prison in modern society? The answer is delivered by an avowedly generative approach. That is to say, it begins with the assumption that it is the inmate’s decision to go straight. This choice may be facilitated in many ways (practically, cognitively, socially, emotionally, economically) by such an intervention. Furthermore, it is assumed that the choice is a tough call and these potential mechanisms are heavily constrained by context in multiple ways already described in Figure 7. 

Generative reasoning in the form of CMO propositions is thus called upon from the outset. Theory elicitation is itself a phase on empirical inquiry and in this case consisted of asking practitioners with long experience of the programme to think through situations in which the men are most and least responsive to the programme. What they latch onto are different types of inmate and their different ways of engaging with the course and the different chances of their new outlook being sustained. And in the process, literally hundreds of such permutations get described. Let me describe just one of them, a configuration that became known as the ‘shelter hypothesis’. This posits that in a maximum security environment (for that is what it was), very young inmates enter prison in a state of mild terror. The education block offers a less forbidding and relatively familiar environment. Accordingly, such programmes might offer shelter and an immediate second chance, before these young men have to confront and become drawn into the macho culture of the wings and a continuing criminal career.

This hunch can then be put to formal statistical test. The core of the analysis is made up of a comparison between the predicted rate of recidivism of men who had undergone the programme and their actual rate. Readers are referred Duguid (2000) for details of the definitions, measures, time-intervals involved in these calculations. It may be worth pointing out that ‘reconviction predictors’ are commonplace in correctional services. The revolving door of re-entry to prison turns at different rates for different groups and so there is already a constant outcome pattern according to whether the offender is a school drop out from a broken home, has an addiction problem, committed violent offence, is of certain age, has a family home to return to after release, and so on. The reconviction predictor captures and weighs these factors providing a probability score for the rehabilitation of any inmate.

The working hypothesis is that undergoing the course will not be beneficial to all but will impact significantly on quite different groups of offenders. The analysis thus concentrates on diverse sub-groups of inmates with diverse criminal social and education backgrounds. For each there is prediction of the historical return rate for groups with the same backgrounds and this is compared with what actually transpired. A simple example is given in Figure 8. The table looks at outcome for prisoner students with sustained involvement in the programme and is subdivided to identify sub-groups of prison students according to their ‘age of admission on the current conviction’.

Figure 8: Subgroup analysis of readmission rates







The data are noteworthy in showing massive difference in successes and failures rates within the programme. These are all men deeply involved the dismal cycle of crime, yet the impact of the course on them is hugely different. Of particular interest the youngest group and here we see, in line with practitioner wisdom, that they comfortably beat history, in the form reconviction prediction.

Let us be quite clear on the causal lessons of row 1. Age demographics (i.e. ‘variables’) are not doing the explanation. It is not the age of these inmates that causes their rehabilitation. Rather, the outcome pattern is an outward trace of some inward process of reasoning of men in different circumstances. The shelter hypothesis has some legs and it might be that the immediate refuge and second chance on offer is the cause of the specific improvement. Incidentally, and looking elsewhere across the outcome pattern, the observed benefit for the two older groups might be due, by contrast, to ‘last chance’ and ‘maturation’ mechanisms. And for the group in the middle, it might be that education cannot penetrate a set of ‘twenty-somethings’, for whom criminal status might be might be the badge of honour recognised for survival on the inside.

In short, our causal explanation is receiving useful support. But, as I have put it repeatedly in the paragraph above, the various hypotheses ‘might be’ correct. So how can the shelter hypothesis be further hardened? The lesson from this particular research is to return empirically to the underlying mechanisms. The research cycle thus revolves from qualitative (the practitioner interviews) to the quantitative (the reconviction prediction comparisons) and back to the qualitative (via interviews with former prisoner students). The aim at was to look for a match between mechanisms as postulated and actually experienced. And to cut a long story short, this testimony provided further useful stanchions for the shelter hypothesis, if in a rather different vernacular. ‘Oh yer, I was scared shitless when I went to X … you got out of the wings nearly all day in education … it was a good skive at first … but things went on from there ...’. Causal explanation requires an understanding of the relevant mechanisms, outcomes and contexts. And the best way to support the causal inference is to have data (qualitative, quantitative and comparative) to support all three.

For my second example, I revisit the middle-age, middle-range of social inquiry and look at one of the largest pieces of empirical research at the time, namely Stouffer et al’s The American Soldier (1949a, 1949b). To be more precise, I want to draw the methodological lessons about causality from Merton’s (1968) celebrated reinterpretation of these studies in his chapter ‘Contributions to the theory of reference group behaviour’. 

Stouffer’s inquiry was a massive survey of attitudes, motivations and beliefs of a large number of conscripts to the US army. The vast majority of these men had not volunteered and the report as a whole picks away minutely at the inner thoughts of those who regarded the draft as ‘at best a grim and reluctantly agreed necessity’. The survey collected face-sheet data (on the men’s race, class, education, religion, region, marital status etc.), institutional data (on the men’s rank, combat level, home/overseas posting, length of service, etc.) and attitudinal data (to the draft but also to promotional opportunities, their physical condition, army welfare and care, etc.). Each possible interrelation is reported in detail, ending in massive two volume study composed of what realist might want to term ‘demi-semi-regs’.

Here is one example of Stouffer’s findings, with reference to drafted married men: ‘Comparing himself with his unmarried associates in the Army, he could feel that induction demanded greater sacrifices from him than from them; and comparing himself with his married civilian friends, he could feel that he had been called on for sacrifices which they were escaping altogether.’ (1949a: 125) The question for present purposes is – what is the nature of the causal explanation here? 

The empirical basis for the claim is clear enough 41% of married inductees claimed that they should not have been drafted at all, that figure dropping to 10% for single men. The causal explanation, however, goes considerably beyond the correlation. Stouffer’s claim is about ‘relative deprivation’. He is postulating a state of affairs something like this. Married life brings with it all manner of responsibilities, commitment, plans and expectations. These are harder to meet in army than in civilian life. The married recruit thus compares himself with non-married draftees, who are free from this welter of duties, and feels deprived. The comparison with married civilians, who continue to attend to their obligations in the normal way, also breeds resentment.

Now, here’s the rub. A whole kit bag of unresearched assumptions is thus smuggled into the findings, and it is this tacit wisdom which is actually doing the explanation. These explanatory mental props are nothing other than the ingredients of generative explanation. The outcome (patterns of deprivation) is generated by the mechanism (invidious comparisons on one’s lot), with the emerging interpretation being shaped by individual and institutional context (volunteer/non-volunteer married/single, low-rank/high-rank, home-posting/overseas-posting, etc.). 

Merton’s essay thus takes on the task of improving on Stouffer’s explanation. His first point about the causal logic illustrated above is that it is post hoc: ‘In this study, as well as in others we consider here, the interpretative concept of relative deprivation was introduced after the field research was completed. This being the case, there was no provision for the collection of independent systematic evidence on the operation of such frameworks of individual judgements.’ (Merton, 1968:302 – italics in original).

Post hoc explanations worry methodologists because they arrive late, from out of the blue as it were, and because they only have to deal with a specific empirical finding, they tend to fit the bill exactly. The call for ‘systematic’ empirical work is thus, first of all, a plea for prior and further evidence to strengthen the argument. Readers will have a strong sense of déjà vu here. What is being called for here is the generative explanatory strategy just discussed. Just as the ‘shelter hypothesis’ was identified early in qualitative field work, affirmed in statistical work and pinned down in later qualitative work, Merton is suggesting a similar approach should have been applied in the American Soldier. 

Moreover, he supplies a crucial further refinement to our understanding of generative explanation by tying it explicitly to a process of theory building. What is doing the explanatory work in the above example is a theory. This one: feelings of relative deprivation follow when people compare their lot to a better-placed reference group. Rather than having this musing as an afterthought to research, Merton wants it to lead inquiry. A whole array of assumptions lie beneath it, which need to be clarified before one can consider it to have done its job and before one can consider it a worthwhile theory. In the particular instance under scrutiny, why did this group of troops consider unmarried soldiers and married civilians as the key point of comparison? This is an important issue, particularly pointed in Stouffer’s inquiry, because the research as a whole shows that the roots of the recruits’ resentment (and well being) spring from all sorts of comparisons – with friends, close colleagues, equal ranks, fellow combatants, social equivalents, racial matches but also sometimes with non-acquaintances, other ranks, cross races, social ‘inferiors’ and ‘superiors’, non-combatants, and so on. So why are these particular sideways glances to the unmarried colleagues and married civilians considered to carry explanatory value in this particular outcome?

To figure out why their thoughts were so directed requires a whole process of theory articulation, building and testing. And it is this function which should drive the collection of empirical evidence, determining in what form, from which source and with what coverage the data should accumulate. Merton spells out some steps in this extra mile to causal explanation, as they apply to the present case:

The first part of the theory is that the posited comparison, if it really is the influential causal agent, must shown to be ‘witting’. That is to say, the data only point to a significant disparity between the views of single and married recruits (and doesn’t even cover non-recruits who are not part of the study). The first thing we need to check out, therefore, is that if the weight of martial responsibilities is indeed the focus of unease, rather than the dozens of other things that may separate married and non married recruits (pay, accommodation, leave, sex lives), then it must be the felt disparity. To harden the causal inference we need to ensure that the assumed generative mechanism, the particular line of reasoning, is present. It is a fair bet that these men find it tough to share in family life whilst soldiering. But we need to hear it from the horses’ mouths and to contrive a research technique to do so.

The second requisite of theory development is as follows. To be felt as the focus of injustice rather than fait accompli or luck of the dice, then the drafting of married men must be seen to run against the norm. A married recruit is much more like to see his service as an injustice if he knew that draft boards tend be more liberal with married men than with singletons. If he knows that excuses tend to be found to discard married men, he bloody well wants to know why he is not in the discard pile. That is ‘relative deprivation’ incarnate. To harden the causal inference thus requires another little phase of inquiry – investigation of recruits’ awareness of institutional custom and practice. 

A third refinement of theory testing is close corollary of the second – on the theme of having to swim against the norm. In Merton’s words, ‘The theory assumes that individuals comparing their own lot with that of others have some knowledge of the situations in which others find themselves. More concretely, it assumes that the individual knows about the comparative rate of induction among married and single men.’ (1969:301, italics in the original). Many of our explanations about how people come to make choices assume broad ‘knowledgeability’ of this kind. In this instance, if the roots of the social actor’s resentment lie in inequity of the outcome pattern, then the actor must have awareness of that general trend. This is a simple hypotheses open to ready inspection. The point, however, is that yet another little subset of data collection must accrue to cover the conjecture.

The fourth way in which the causal inference might be hardened would be to check how directly the assumed inequity has impacted upon the respondent. Clearly not all married men disparage the draft. One way to refine the relative deprivation explanation, whilst allowing for these exceptions, would be to posit that comparison becomes more invidious the ‘closer to home’ it gets. In other words, it would be useful to discover whether the relative in ‘relative deprivation’ lies in a comparison with ‘know associates’ of whether it spreads more widely to ‘impersonal social categories’ (Merton, 1969: 303). Do the roots of resentment lie in the fact that the happily-wedded Private Smith’s best friend, the happily-wedded Mr Jones, has not been drafted, and that Smith is barracked, moreover, with and by a group of single, lovelorn squaddies? Or does Smith cast his eyes wider and ponder the broader vectors of draft decisions – why am I one of the few out of so many? Again, I leave in the air the particulars of the tricky research design needed to put such an idea to empirical test. Hopefully, the crucial point is now crystal clear. Testing this and the other conjectures is the way to make and strengthen causal inferences.

Between them, our two illustrations lay down road map to the generative causal explanation. An interesting, puzzling, nascent outcome pattern pricks our imagination. Understanding the incipient regularity is a matter of postulating the mechanisms that might have brought it about and the contexts which sustain the action of the mechanism. These explanatory agents take inquiry beyond ‘variables’ and their testing pulls in multi-sourced evidence on meanings, processes, cultures and structures. The explanation is pursued by creating and testing theories of how and in what contexts the causal mechanism operates. The better the theory, the more precision and power will obtain in explaining the depth and breadth of the outcome pattern.

That, ladies and gentlemen, completes the account of the third of our trio of causal logics. As ever, I conclude with a tantalising tailpiece on the role of theory within this strategy. Theory, as you now know, having endured the tutorial, is thrust to the core of generative causal explanation, driving the search for apposite data. That point made, I also signal a further prize, to which later I will return more fully. Reconfiguring causal explanation in this way points to a solution to another venerable explanatory puzzle – that of generalisation. We want causal explanations to do general service. We want them to mark something enduring about social order. So what of the previous example? It is, after all, not only men in uniform in mid-twentieth-century who feel relatively deprived. So, in all walks of life, do the unsung, the underprivileged, the underpaid, the underused. Might the same generative theories, and the process of testing them, also do service here?

Contested Causality: The play-offs

This section compares and contrasts our three models and declares the generative account to be a superior basis for building enduring, cumulative causal explanations. By this, I do not mean to imply, of course, that experimentation should wither, that survey investigation should cease, that comparative study should wane, and that configurational analysis should terminate. That would be perfect nonsense, for these approaches provide vital data on the patterns, differences and diversity in society. They provide the raw materials to be explained. The argument, therefore, is that the associated tools and techniques should be subordinated to and co-ordinated by a programme of generative theory building. This claim is developed in four steps, three condemning the vices of successionism / configurationism and a fourth proclaiming the virtues of the generative account. A brief preview is offered here.

The first critique is about the hidden, tacit, invisible usage of generative thinking within the other accounts. There are always moments (especially during hypothesis construction and model interpretation) within the first two methods when the account slips into mechanism mode. Look hard and, invariably, you will make out a generative genie standing on the shoulders of the substantive researcher whispering some of reasons why particular correlations and configurations make sense. The whisper, it is suggested, should be turned into a roar

The second critique is about omissions from the successionist and configurational accounts. As we have seen, variables and attributes and their relationships are charged with delivering the causal account. However, in all substantive applications there are forces that cannot be so described and measured, and which nevertheless structure what occurs. Powers and dispositions located in agents’ reasoning and structural constraint are needed to complete causal accounts and can only be delivered via generative reasoning and research. This claim is disputed within the ranks of the modellers, who point, for instance, to the explanatory role of mediators and moderators within causal accounts. But intervening variables are not the same as mechanisms – and on this point battle is joined.

The third argument takes us to end point, namely the findings of succesionist and configurational accounts. Because all emphasis is placed on limited explanatory ingredients, variable-based and attribute-based explanations are inherently incomplete and incompletable. It is always possible to delve further into the sequences and configurations depicted in the models by adding more variable or attributes, unpacking residuals, drawing in further comparisons, considering alternative measures and so on. Because the sociological imagination is limitless it is always possible to add such ‘element-by-element’ complexity. But dealing with complexity in the form of introducing variable X123 or attribute A234 is self-defeating. All other coefficients and estimates change with each such iteration. There are no enduring empirical generalisations. Such is the natural terminus of the first two strategies. They lapse into descriptive sprawl rather than explanatory cogency. 

The final section of the paper returns to the advantages of the generative account. The immediate gain is the ability to grab hold of parts that other strategies cannot reach. Instead of genie-inspired hunches and afterthoughts, the method is driven by a full blown theory describing the choices that potentially give rise to social regularities as well as the contextual influence that limit the ability of such volitions to come to fruition. Generative reasoning surfaces and articulates the missing ingredients identified in the first to critiques above. In doing so, it calls of on more powerful array of data and methods to corroborate causal claims. All of these advantages have been prefigured in building the account of generative explanation in the first part of the essay. 

Accordingly, a rather different property of generative explanation is underscored here, describing a feature not yet given full prominence in the unfolding argument. Generative explanations, too, struggle with causal complexity. The fact that context-mechanism-outcome configurations provide greater explanatory agility than variable or attribute based models does not mean that they are in any sense final or complete. Just as it is always possible to add another variable into a path model, the same sociological imagination will fetch up with accounts of choice making by the dozen and hypothesis on potential contextual constraints by the score. Any particular inquiry will thus end in a provisional explanation.

What then gives generative reasoning its explanatory edge? My answer can be put in way that contrives significant merit to the contemporary ear, namely the capacity for mechanism explanation to be recycled. As described in critique three above, variable and attribute based accounts merely grow in a torpid mass of descriptive particulars. Take them elsewhere, try out a model developed in domain A and apply it in domain B, and all the coefficients and configurations change. This is not the case with generative explanations because the explanatory ingredients describe processes that are generic. The process of constrained choice making underpinning a regularity in substantive area A will often have broad similarities to that which obtains in substantive area B. Hopes are raised and dashed in all walks of like in a brutally similar fashion. What brings authority to causal explanation is a history of successful application.
The generative genie 

To begin, let me stray well beyond my parochial expertise and peer valiantly into the human psyche itself. There appears to be something about us compelling us to name causes. Someone in there, out there, up there, wants us to think in terms of causal arrows. Recently, I listened in to a conversation between mother and child. The latter was in unrelenting interrogation mode … Why does this happen? Why does this do that?  What makes this like this? Why can he do that? Why can’t I do that? To each query, the mother supplied a reason, a basis, a rationale – according to a well-rehearsed formula, ‘because of … X’. In each case, only one X was put forward but this seemed to do the trick. The child’s brain assimilated, ‘ah, that’s it, so that’s it, so that’s it …’. This in turn caused me to ponder – what’s been seeded here? Is our liking for prime causes perhaps related to our need for prime suspects, prime movers, prime concerns, prime cuts, prime numbers and so on?

What seemed to satisfy the tyro investigator also seems to work for grown-ups. The media, it appears, like to tickle us with the daily ‘causal challenge’. These are snippets from the world of research that are deemed newsworthy – sometimes because they reveal something important about the state of the nation and sometimes because of a chance of light relief at the expense of ‘crackpot scientists’. Two recent instances that passed my gaze were items on:

	Type of school attended (private versus state) and its influence on Oxbridge admission
	 Eye colour (blue versus brown) and its influence on intelligence

Of interest is how the causal debate is framed. Partly, it is a matter of the plausibility of the basic claim, with the former being worthy of detailed attention (i.e. 2 minutes) and with the latter having the makings of a whimsical aside (about 45 seconds). Once on air, it works like this. The basic finding and its auspices are introduced – advantage flows to x% in the first category versus y% in the second.  Scepticism is allowed, even encouraged. The presenter, for instance, might introduce other causes. Aren’t ‘A level’ results the deciding factor in university admissions? Surely you’re not arguing that upbringing is unimportant to intelligence? Better still, a working class Oxford undergraduate might to asked to contribute, or the angry e-mails of brown-eyes might be read out as a tailpiece. And for the most part that is as far as it gets, the causal stand-off – ‘my variable is better than your variable’.

Rarely, very occasionally, the question ‘why’ is introduced into the broadcast (and for this one needs to be listening to Radio 4). In general terms, one longs for mechanisms in debates in the public forum. OK, state kids don’t show up in due proportion at Oxford. But is this because: i) donnish admissions tutors can’t imagine the unwashed from Scunthorpe as suitable cases for cloistering, or ii) state kids anticipate a supercilious reception and choose less snobby Leeds, or iii) alumni contacts provide the networks and neckties to smooth the application process for privateers, etc. And, of the bright eyes: i) what (on earth) is the biological/genetic mechanism of action for the link between eye colour and intelligence? or, ii) are the social advantages that nurture intelligence found disproportionally amongst families and communities of the blue eyes?

We now reach the serious side of these playful asides about common-sense causation. The problem is that some of the priorities witnessed here pass through the membrane into formal social scientific investigation. Variables and attributes come first. A rival set of variables and attributes come second. The ‘why question’ comes last.

This section suggest some reasons why this is the running order in most empirical inquiry. Why do we begin with casual arrows? Why are they ubiquitous in sociological reasoning? My answer is that it is all the doing of the generative genie, playing right at the back of the researcher’s mind. Independent variables make it to the line up of potential causes because we can immediately summon up reasons for their efficacy. Why we take them seriously in the first place because of our instant ability to supply the associated thinking. Generative mechanisms lurk, they fire the sociological imagination, but they often remain unspoken. Accordingly, we slip very comfortably into a language which simply says ‘X causes Y’. The phrase is used as shorthand. The problem is that we have become habituated to the abbreviation. 
 
The most palpable and the most irritating usage of the shorthand is in evaluation research, in centring on the question, ‘does the programme work?’. This is a causal arrow proposition – did the intervention bring about the intended outcome? But it is not ‘programmes’ that work; that is merely a lazy linguistic expression. Programmes provide resources, subjects ponder what is on offer, and then take or leave the offering. And it is the balance of these decisions that is the causal agent leading to success or failure. We have seen this causal process at work in the case of prisoner education programme. The intervention provide a resources which somewhat widen the nonetheless narrow range choices open to inmates on release. Released inmates then come to decisions on which path to take and the assemblage of choices is the real causal explanation of the complex outcome pattern that unfolds.

So it is with all programmes, they are vehicles for change process rather than the cause of change. Take even the simplest technical interventions, such as the introduction of CCTV into car parks to prevent vehicle crime. The cameras do not stop thieves from taking cars; they do not form some kind of physical barrier. What stops the potential thief are chains of reasoning. If the thief is aware of the camera, prevention is a matter of him recalculating upwards the odds of getting caught. If the thief is unaware of the camera, preventative powers belong to operators and their ability to spot suspicious actions and to summon police in time. If neither thief nor operator is aware of the crime, then prevention turns on the ability of the police to match video images with records and their capacity to trace and detain the perpetrator. 

All this is symptomatic of the problem with generative genies. Researchers ‘kind of know’ that all these undercurrents are in play. These tacit assumptions (the programme theory) made the intervention and the evaluation worthwhile in the first place. But the die is cast. Having set up the research question as ‘did the programme really work?’, it becomes, de facto, the causal agent under investigation. And we are led down the garden path of chasing causation with the counterfactual logic, contriving controlled experiments to compare crime cutback in car parks with and without CCTV.

Generative genies have been busy throughout this paper, especially in the early sections explicating the successionist and configurational models (subsequently, of course, they turn into generative giants). Let me return to a further familiar example that invariably crops up in survey analysis on educational attainment. One causal path that always features in such inquiry is whether there is an influence of the variable ‘social class’ on the variable ‘educational attainment’. But what has already happened with this formulation, once again, is that the die of inquiry is cast. The question is now about whether this (or any other paths/influences) is statistically significant. A similar malapropos terminological tic has triggered us into action. Again, it is not ‘class’ that causes ‘education’. What this means in explanatory longhand is that parents’ class position bestows a tapering range of resources for children. These then widen or foreshorten educational choices in different class positions and it is the collective and loaded decisions to grasp these opportunities that brings about disparity. I am going to spell out some of decision shortly, the preliminary point is simply to note that what is in our mind’s eye when we note this correlation are parents striving on behalf of their kids.

This tendency to truncate the causal question is also evident in the technical applications of configurational analysis. For my case study here I return Ragin’s example of the combinations of attributes that lead to the violent overthrow of popular protest. The interesting twist in such findings, the reader will recall, is that quite different configurations may lead to the same outcome. Repression follows in cases where there is undemocratic government combined with a strong military, and also, in cases where there is democratic government but no industrialisation. In both instances it is not the combination of attributes per se that is the causal agent. The fact that A sits alongside B is not a cause. Coterminous conditions are not the cause of collective action, merely its medium. Just as with causal arrows, the combination of binary attributes is mere shorthand for a more complex generative process. Ragin’s own generative genie begins to supply the reasoning as follows (1994:117): ‘The first combination suggests a situation where the military establishment has gained the upper hand in part because of the absence of checks on its power. The second configuration suggests a situation where a breakdown of democratic rule occurred in countries that lacked many of the social structures associated with industrialisation (for example, urbanisation, education, literacy and so on). These social structures are believed to facilitate stable democratic rule.’

I note, in passing, that this second explanation leaves me wondering how democratic governments have developed in the first place without urbanisation, education, literacy and so on. But it is not a substantive point I’m driving towards here. The key theme is now hopefully clear – what is actually doing the causal explanation in all the above examples are tacit assumptions, educated guesses, common-sense hunches. In this instance, we know that strong militaries, without the constraining forces an elected government are inclined to take matters in their own hands against perceived threats against their authority. We mentally picture such cases and imagine further (at least I do) that the military probably makes up the undemocratic government. The opposed binary pair (strong military, undemocratic government) may well be the same entity. Dictatorship may be at work. These little chains of reasoning about societal power dynamics are not part of the assembled data, and yet they do the explanatory work. As I have tried to show in the first part of the paper, these implicit, mini-theories generally make a fleeting appearance at the start and the end of inquiry but play no part in the analytic middle. So what is wrong with such an explanatory process?

The problem with not surfacing the real generative agents is that leads to the heinous crimes of ad-hocery and black-boxism. Let us start with the former. However solid and seemingly sensible are these hunches, the problem is that they remain untested in the inquiry. They make good sense of observed outcome patterns but so too will alternative explanation. Stinchcombe (1968) put this rather brutally a number of years ago in his famous phrase advising sociology students to choose another profession if they have any difficulty in ‘thinking of at least three sensible explanations for any correlation’.

Let us gather evidence on Stinchcombe’s thesis. First, look at the terminology and his choice of the term ‘sensible explanations’. What he is getting at is the level of proof involved. The hard evidence is in the numbers, so ad hoc explanations have to do is meet of the test of being plausible. And, interestingly, this is precisely the vernacular in which such explanatory claims are usually made. All the successionist researcher has to say and can say is that these ideas amount to feasible claims. In the detailed illustrations above researchers come up with phrases like ‘the data suggests …’, ‘it might be that …’, ‘one explanation is …’, ‘explanation lies in the processes of …’, ‘subjects are likely to …’, and so on. NEED TO CITE MORE CLOSELY

The second and perhaps defining feature of ad hoc explanation is expediency. Explanations are designed for the specific purpose at hand and no more. That purpose in the guise of causal models is to explain how the analysis ‘comes out’, which paths prove statistically significant. It is much the same in comparative analysis, explaining those configurations which survive after Boolean simplification. The problem here is that such explanations can be contrived however the statistical models come out. For instance, should we discover, with Grossman and Tierney, that white little brothers report a sharper move away from aggressive behaviour that do black little brothers, we might come up with the explanation that ‘it might be that aggression is more deeply embedded in black youth gangs and thus harder to ameliorate’. If the numbers turned out the other way round and the white kids remained resolutely macho, a different kind of explanatory fix is needed, ‘it might be that black big brothers have the experience to combat gang culture, whilst the experience of white big brothers tends to education and work’. Heads you win, tails you win.

The third feature of ad hoc explanations is superficiality, in the sense that all is required of them is to skim to surface of the noteworthy regularity. Let us revisit the prisoner education example to show what I have in mind here. It would be quite possible to conduct a survey of prisoners and their experiences in order to try to pinpoint which attributes and behaviours seem to beneficial in the ability to avoid the revolving door of reincarceration. Such analysis may throw up ‘age’ and ‘education’ as significant marker of success, and may be able to isolate relatively high rates of rehabilitation for young prisoner who undergo extensive education whilst doing time. According to how many other variables are in the survey, there is then a job to do in making sense of the potentially dozens of significant interlinkages. Hence, as just described, expediency fires in. The upshot is that expediency multiplied dozens of times then goes on to equate to superficiality. It is not the age of these prisoners’ bones as they sit in the classroom that somehow causes rehabilitation. An explanation needs to be contrived. Many are available. It may even be that the researcher comes up with a version of the ‘shelter’ hypothesis that was explored earlier. But that would be as far as it could possibility go since many, many other influences will be observed and need rationalising within the causal model. The possibility that education offered some sort of immediate and familiar respite would remain a hunch. This contrasts with a generative explanation, which surfaces and articulates the underlying mechanism, drives the quantitative analysis to look for corresponding outcome patterns and then hardens the causal inference using other types of data collected from different agents.

The final test of Stinchcombe’s theory is the matter of arithmetic. He wants his students to be able to tell at least three plausible stories to explain a correlation. They are only students, of course, but since the basic requirements are plausibility, expediency and superficiality, I reckon he is being kind. The fact that it is as easy as one-two-three is shown in a passing example above on class disadvantage in Oxbridge entry. In one sentence, in two seconds, I fixed the causal locus on three different agents, admissions tutors, prospective students and alumni networks. If we return to the redoubtable causal arrow between social class and educational attainment, explanations really multiply. Could it be that, relatively speaking, the middle classes … read more to their kids … are better a liaising with school … are prepared to move to superior catchment areas … are more likely to pay for private schooling and support tuition … spend more time on homework … coach tests and examinations … speak in elaborated codes … buy computers, text books and exam guides … ‘oversee’ course work assessment … join governing bodies and parent teacher associations … introduce supportive cultural activities … provide a taxi service for extra curricular events … engineer advantageous introductions … breed confidence in social interaction … provide practice and involvement in decision-making? And when all that fails, might they be quicker in seeking out and utilising diagnostic services? And to boot, might there be a dozen further reasons why teaching profession pays their kids more attention in the first place? The list can go on forever and that is the problem with explanatory hunches.





In the proceeding section I have tried show that much that is really decisive about causal explanation is smuggled in by the back door in variable and attribute methodology. This section discusses in more detail the missing ingredients via a critical analysis of two modes of successionist analysis, randomised controlled and multivariate analysis.

A good way to locate lost explanatory causes is to look into the ‘black box’ of experimentalism. The black box problem refers to the fact that, under experimentalism, one doesn’t need to know what is going on within a programme to be able to measure whether experimentees outperform controls. The critique here (much rehearsed in Pawson and Tilley (1997) and Pawson (2006)) is that the quest to achieve control in randomised trials squeezes out of the picture precisely those mechanism and contexts that are required in understanding whether a programme works. Powers and dispositions located in the agents’ reasoning (within the black box) and in the societal and institutional constraints on the intervention (beyond the black box) are needed to complete causal accounts.

Rather than run this argument in full and the abstract here, let us return to our original example – the RCT of the BBBS mentoring programme, in order to view some typical explanatory holes. It is entirely obvious that youths’ predispositions and motivations are going to colour their ‘engagement’ with the intervention. Indeed, the policy thrust towards befriending and mentoring has come to the fore in the struggle to deal with ‘disengaged’ youth. Disengagement can cover everyone from the drug-ridden, crime-dependent wreck to the mildly pissed off. So how does the RCT deal with such potentially diverse motivations? Answer – clear predispositions out of the picture entirely and conduct the experiment only on volunteers. At a stroke prior expectations are controlled; experimentees and those on the waiting list controls are rendered equally willing horses.

But how willing? If we dig a little deeper into the administrative background of this intervention and this experiment some interesting data emerges. Little bothers and little sisters are rather young (mean age 12, with 80% being 13 and under). In terms of race and gender, they are 23% minority girls, 34% minority boys, 15% white girls, 23%, white boys. They have some of the characteristics of social deprivation but this by no means applies to the majority: 43% live in a home receiving public assistance; 39% of parents are divorced or separated; 40% have a history of domestic violence; 21% have suffered emotional abuse; and 11.2% have experienced physical abuse. This is a rather mixed bag. Indubitably, we are dealing with some of America’s ‘disadvantaged’ young people but they do not all posses the multiple, ingrained characteristics targeted in other mentoring programmes. 

This face sheet data is, of course, only a faint proxy for the volitional tendencies of the mentees. Can we discover anything more concrete about their hopes and ambitions? The programme carries a clear set of entry and eligibility requirements, and some vital clues on the participants’ aspirations lie here. BBBS screening involves: an assessment for a ‘minimal level of social skills’; an interview ensuring that youths and parents actually ‘want a mentor’; a signed agreement of parent and child ‘to follow agency rules’; the successful completion of ‘orientation and training sessions’; and the fulfilment of ‘residential and age limitations’. After the induction period placement occurred, which itself was a prolonged procedure. Matching with a mentor was achieved for 78% of the would-be mentees, with an average waiting time of 4.7 months, the shortage of suitable mentors being especially acute for minority boys, for whom the average delay was 5.9 months. In addition to these programme requirements, the research created exclusions of its own, namely for: those with ‘physical and learning difficulties’ not allowing them to complete a telephone interview; those on ‘special programmes’ within the overall BBBS package; and those ‘serving a contractual obligation such as Child Protection Service contract’. This welter of self, bureaucratic and investigatory selection is, of course, significant. The research may have ‘controlled for’ motivation but it is not too brave an inference to observe that the programme and the experiment dealt with a relatively compliant and particularly persevering set of mentees.

Now, what of the content and context of the mentoring itself? Again, these specifics are not part of the experimental design, other than the expectation that the experimentees cop for the programme in its full blown glory whilst the controls do not. The ‘offer’, however, is hardly irrelevant and a look at BBBS promotional (ref) material reveals a rather spectacular inventory. For each volunteer mentor there is an careful and extensive screening that weeds out adults ‘who are unlikely to keep their time commitments or who may pose a risk to youth’. For each approved mentor there is training that ‘includes communication and limit-setting skills, tips on relationship building and recommendations on the best way to interact with a young person’. For each potential partnership, there is a matching procedure that ‘take[s] into account the preferences of youth, his or her family, and the volunteer, and that use a professional case manager to analyse which volunteer would work best with each youth’. For each ongoing partnership there is close supervision and support ‘by the case manager who makes frequent contact with the parent/guardian, volunteer, and youth and provides assistance when requested, as difficulties arise’. This list arguably omits one of its key features. A glance at the history of BBBS shows that is a ‘sturdy programme’, surviving in different forms for a whole century (Freedman, 1993). Given the queue for places, it is quite likely that there was some local kudos in being a ‘graduate’ from these particular schemes and, perhaps, to regard them as a passport out of social deprivation. 

So what is unearthed, with just a little digging around, are some potential mechanisms and contexts that might well be significant in accounting for the success of the scheme. And we complete this brief inspection by looking again out those gains. What we have are outcome data showing a general pattern of modest improvement of the experimentees over the controls on a wide range of social and educational measures. The changes however are uneven and not all positive and the experimental design can offer no explanations thereupon, other than ad hoc speculation. Likewise, improvement varies markedly by sub-group, the explanation of which requires exploration of further motivational theories, which play no part in the experimental design. Then there is that matter of the measurement instrument itself – ‘self-report’ on a battery of attitudes and behaviours, before and after the programme. An obvious problem here is that there might be a halo effect ringing through these outcomes, especially if one supposes that the programme has attracted the relatively saintly.

So, at the end of the day, the question is – what is the status in causal terns of the BBBS experiment? It is hard to see any enduring truths here. There are certainly no causal laws. And the uniformities uncovered (if that is the right word) are internally complex. Overall, the suspicion lurks that the programme works thanks to its well-oiled and much-prized institutional base aimed at well-motivated and cheery-picked subjects. The outcome data, the variable analysis, describes the outward consequences of that state of affairs in careful, painstaking detail. But that is precisely what the experiment achieves – description. To understanding what is really going on, and to have any chance of learning from success, requires penetrating the black box and a much closer inspection of the programme mechanisms and contexts.

For the next critique, I turn to the successionist use of multivariate analysis (causal models, path analysis, Lisrel etc.). We must move smartly because proponents of these forms of variable analysis will have been waiting impatiently with a counter critique. They are breathing fire because, for them, my so-called ‘missing ingredients’, ‘mechanisms’ and ‘contexts’, are dealt with perfectly adequately by incorporating ‘intervening variables’ into statistical analysis. In particular, two specific kinds of variables, namely – ‘mediators’ and ‘moderators’ are considered to perform the equivalent explanatory function. 

For an example of the use of the first of these, I refer readers back to figure 3 and the ‘causal pathways’ analysis of BBBS. Here, the analysis of intervening variables figure prominently in the explanation of how ‘mentoring’ has been turned into educational progress (reported reductions in ‘skipping school’ and improvements in ‘grades’). According to the model, one process that seems to be important is that mapped by the change in a variable measuring the mentees judgement on the ‘quality of their relations with parents’ as perceived during the programme. Many of those reporting educational progress also report that things have improved with their parents. The inference charted by the causal arrows is thus that mentoring influences domestic harmony which in turns influences effort at school. Such is the nature of explanation by intervening variable and that, chivvy my critics, covers precisely what you mean by a generative mechanism!

My response follows in classic style – ‘oh no it doesn’t!’ To be sure, a couple of useful demi-regs have been discovered amidst the programme. But that is all they are – because they too need explaining. Recall, Rhodes’s post-hoc account of the significance of the interrelationship, ‘if parents feel involved in, as opposed to supplanted by the provision of additional adult support, they are likely to reinforce mentors’ positive influences’. Recall also that that is the full extent of the explanation because in these typically variable-rich models, the hard work is considered done in getting out the estimates, leaving this particular explanation as but one of the many glosses required to cover the multiple pathways described. We may question, therefore, is it right? The tricky sensitivities involved in parents feeling supported rather than usurped have most certainly not been investigated as part of the research. And, isn’t it the case that parents have to fight tooth and nail to get their kids into BBBS? So why might they fear the risk of  being ‘supplanted’ in the first place and why might the discovery that they are not sidelined then be translated into further encouragement to get the kids to school? We have no idea. It could just as well have happened the other way around – perhaps the kids have previously ignored the ineffectual urgings of mother but treat her with renewed respect because she has engineered for them a rare move in BBBS.

OK, so Rhodes’s is a thin and rather ad hoc explanation but it is not at least mechanism? Oh no it isn’t! What the causal model tells us is that there is a statistically significant association between being on the programme and reporting increased parental harmony as well as a further significant relation between reporting increased parental harmony and reporting skipping school less frequently. Both associations still need explaining. And, with Stinchcombe’s axiom and without more focused enquiry, many, many plausible explanations remain on the table.

Why might a programme involving one-to-one befriending of a young person improve his/her relationships at home? One needs a mechanism (an understanding of the constrained collective choices at work) to understand why. Perhaps it is a key part of the mentor’s role to constantly urge respect for the parent. Perhaps it is the safety net provided by visits of the case manager, allowing the parent to feel calmer and more confident that she is not alone. Perhaps it is the flowering of the child’s understanding of the difficulties of parenthood, in sympathy with the mentor’s own tales of woe. Perhaps it is part of a more general feel-good factor as life’s chances improve. Perhaps, as above, it is renewed respect for a parent who has beaten the queue to get into BBBS. 

To be sure, the list could continue but we have the other half of the intervening relationship to explain. Why might improvements on the home front lead to improvements on the school front? Most obviously, it might be renewed respect for parents that leads the child to do their bidding. Or, it could be the other way round, with the child seeking to repair relations at home by ceasing to truant. It might also be a shared understanding of the obligations of the scheme that leads the child to follow the rules. Or, it might be that a specific part of the mentoring process is to involve  parents in school activity. Or, it might conceivably be a devil’s pact – the scheme’s prizes remain available if the child reports she no longer skips school (recall that data collection is by self-report).  

Intervening variables and so-called ‘indirect’ causal pathways are not the same as mechanisms. They are merely outcome patterns, more complex demi-regs that still need explaining. Each separate arrow in a causal model should be thought of as an outcome pattern in a generative model, fired by underlying mechanisms and constrained by context. Without knowledge of these processes, the explanation for the partial relationship remains guesswork. 

The example provides us with an interesting glimpse of the appropriate balance between the successionist and the generative models. The discovery that one-to-one mentoring has its affect, and spreads its effects, though the family is an important step. But it only becomes a causal explanation if we can say why this occurs. Such depth explication is also imperative in policy inquiry. As we see in the Stinchcombian speculations above, there are many potential pathways to parental insinuation in the scheme. Without knowing something about which or them occurs, there is not a hope of reproducing the scheme and its success.

It is an entirely equivalent story for moderators. There are mere variables and do not perform the same role as ‘context’ in generative caution, with the result that explanation suffers in much the same way. Moderators describe situations in which a correlation between two variables changes. Let us follow through the idea through using very powerful instances that crop up in programme evaluation. Here, moderators describe ‘sub-population’ effects, which are commonplace and lead to the intervention having a different effect in one sub-group (G1: X Y1) than another (G2: X Y2). Let us leave mentoring for a while and examine a set of interventions know as ‘welfare to work’ programmes. They involve financial incentives to move off assistance as well as help in job search and may well, incidentally, be aimed at the parents of the BBBS youngsters. It has been discovered in meta-analysis (Ashworth, 2004) that they are more successful for male rather than female subjects. 

Is the fact that this powerful moderator shows up clearly and repeatedly across a couple of dozen primary studies sufficient to convince us that some causal relation is operation? Oh no it isn’t! ‘Gender’ does not cause the programme to operate one way and then other. The variable measured by the sex of the programme recipient does not ‘cause’ anything. What is going on and what is really causing the outcome difference is that a substantial amount of women are making different choices then do men when confronted by programme resources. And to understand what makes for these differential choices we require some understanding of how context conditions the action of the mechanism – how living in a woman’s as opposed to man’s world changes the nature of the choices opened up in these schemes. 

Edin and Lein (1997) provide some useful clues on the mechanisms and contexts involved. The intervention offers a package of carrots and sticks to influence subjects to move from welfare to work. Whether women do so depends on their reasoning about the overall change in household budget that would result from loosing some benefits and taking up low paid work. Edin and Lein quantified the typical weekly spend and discovered that most women welfare recipients have a family budget which is not covered by welfare income. Accordingly, many of them operate ‘on the side’ to make ends meet. Supplemental income comes from unreported work in the moonlight economy, illegal work in the drugs and sex trade, and informal work for the family and neighbours, as well as from donations from charities, friends and kin. Which of these opportunities presents itself varies, in turn, with the communities in which they live, with some local economies offering substantial opportunities for side work, with some casework regimes allowing more latitude for working unnoticed, and so. In short, the introduction of the welfare-to-work regime is met by an extremely subtle calculation about which of the above activities will have to be jettisoned and which can be maintained once inside the workforce, and, on balance, whether needs will be met any more comfortably. 

My point in running through these little fragments of evidence is that they begin to supply the real causal analysis of why men and women might differ in their response to the programme. Broadly speaking, women seem to have less good prospects in the formal economy and more obligations that can be met informally. This, rather than the raw ‘gender moderator’ is the key policy lesson. The crucial methodological point, however, is about causation. Without some theory of why gender has made a difference, it remains just another variable alongside dozens and dozens of others that can describe the hundreds and hundreds of different experiences of being urged to move from welfare to work.





Talk of dozens or even hundreds of variables leads me to the final critique of the successionist and configurational strategies. The problem is this. How does one complete a causal account based on variables or attributes? How does one achieve explanatory closure?

The issue can be stated quite simply. If variables are causal agents, how many of them does the research need to take into account in order to ensure that the relationships and coefficients modelled have some enduring explanatory capacity? In the experimental versions of variable analysis we have already encountered our answer, namely – all of them. The idea is to control for all confounding effects, allowing the ‘treatment’ to work in isolation. We have seen logic this come woefully undone in field experiments where the experimental treatment is internally complex and the field is externally complex. 

How is closure envisaged in multivariate and configurational analysis, and are these strategies any more watertight? In the former, the end point of analysis is achieved pragmatically. More variables are added into the statistical analysis up to a point when the imagination runs out in devising them and when the influence of each new variable, net of the influence due to other characteristics, is reckoned to become small. The problem here is that no two sociological imaginations and ready reckonings are the same. One analyst’s pragmatism is another’s obduracy:

“In one form or another, we constantly encounter the following argument: ‘The investigator did not control for X14: Had such a control been made, then the influence of X8 on Y would be quite different from the results obtained by the investigator’. In addition, if control variable X14 cannot be measured adequately or is not used for some other reason, someone disinclined to accept the empirically determined influence of X8 can claim that the observed effect would be radically different if only X14 were tossed into the statistical hopper.” (Lieberson, 1985)

Exactly the same argument applies in configurational and Boolean analysis, though perhaps with a vengeance. Here, the unit of analysis is the ‘attribute’ of a system, often very basic characterisations of components of a nation’s social and economic organisation. Conceptualisation and measurement here is much contested and attributes are enormously difficult to capture in the simple binary form required of the technique. To see this, one needs to return to figure 5 with the critical eye of an historian, and imagine the cell-by-cell disputes about whether the classification of country 1 as ‘aligned with the US’ or as ‘industrialised’ gets anywhere near capturing the actual political intrigues and mixed forms of production. In other words, Lieberson’s critique applies again. What about adding the unconsidered influence of A14 to the configurational hopper ? Doesn’t the dodgy measurement of A8 mean that causal configurations in which it is identified must be taken with a pinch of salt?

Dodd’s ‘pan sample’ in here? Ask MW.

The closure of multivariate and configurational models thus relies on a heavy dose of pragmatism (which, incidentally, is often disguised in the unheralded statistical ‘assumptions’ required to complete estimates in the models – e.g. the supposition that residual terms are uncorrelated). Pragmatism can be a worthy cause – indeed any empirical researcher who is not a pragmatist will never get the job done. But this does raise a question about the status of the ‘models’ that emerge from such analysis. Think of Rhodes’s path model of mentoring influences (figure 3) or Ragin’s core configurations about influences on tracking in elementary schools (on page 12). What are they? They are certainly not immutable causal laws of mentoring and tracking. We should expect subtle changes in the estimates with the addition of different variables and attributes, or with alternative ways of measuring and classifying each one. 

Moreover, if the analysis was performed on a different set of mentoring programmes or school districts, there is no expectation that the paths, configurations and estimates would turn out the same. The models cannot and, in most hands, do not and claim external validity. So what are they? At worst they can be condemned as mere description (c.f. Boudon, 2002). And the problem with description is that it is a never ending story. Just as the narrative of an ethnographer is potentially infinite and has to be halted arbitrarily, at some point the statistician has to pull the plug at X14 and A14 and settle for the way they have been measured. Other endless descriptive statistical stories are then always available covering X15 and A15 onwards and the alternative ways of measuring them.

More charitably, we can identify path models and core configurations for what they are, namely ‘demi-regs’. They are not the end product of analysis but local uniformities describing the way that social behaviour is patterned. As such they are still in need of explaining. However, because the data is likely to be have collected rigorously and assiduously, and because, being multivariate, they allow for a degree of complexity and intricacy, they are a superior species of demi-reg. But they still need explaining. And they need explaining by processes and structures which cannot be captured as variables or attributes. Closure will always escape them.

This point about the narrowness of the available explanatory ingredients, and the futility of relentlessly piling them up, brings us to end of the critical section of the paper. Oddly enough, the critique offered here is itself a never-ending story. It is usually futile to try to trace the dawning point of methodological arguments, though I can say that in my sociological lifetime the critique offered here has been pursued by Boudon (1976, 1979), Lieberson (1985), myself (1989), Abbott (1998), Byrne (2002), Hedström (2005), Cherkaoui (2005), and no doubt others. It even has a stunning catch-phrase, ‘causal models are neither’ – the source of which I am completely unable to recall, and the deciphering of which I leave to the reader. But curiously, such reasoning has made only limited headway and certainly not won the day. And this is why it is raised again here, in the hope that new adherents will possess beginner’s luck.

Abstraction and the confederation of causal explanations

This section returns to the generative account and its benefits for those seeking to build causal explanations. What I have tried to show in the previous account of this strategy is the way that a theory driven-investigation of an apparent social uniformity digs down, almost literally, to its roots. So in the Merton / Stouffer example we begin with an interesting outcome pattern about married recruit’s disgruntlement with the draft. We can make sense of it progressively by testing mini-theories about its essence -  do married recruits routinely experience soldiering as antithetical to family responsibilities, have they seen enough of recruitment practices to be aware of generally lenient treatment to the married, do they know the relative numbers and that the draft leans disproportionally towards the single, to what extent are they locally isolated as married soldier and surrounded by the single in their patrols and barracks? What occurs in such a process of theory testing is the refinement and consolidation of explanation. There is a progressive sense-making that contrasts with the constant battle with the extraneous and the confounding and the contingent in the rival models. All this, however, is merely to paraphrase the earlier claims and arguments.

Is it sufficient reason to declare game, set and match to the generativists? The answer is unequivocally no, since I’ve yet to fully unveil another key property of the strategy. This relates to thorny issue of explanatory reach. As I’ve tried to show in the previous section, if one perceives a world make up of variables/attributes one is immediately seized by the problem that everything potentially causes everything. And in response to the question, ‘shouldn’t you have taken this into account?’, causal models bloat and truth tables engorge. Now, it may seem that tunnel vision provided by the generative approach provides the solution – we stick to explaining well-delimited uniformities by digging down ever more closely to their generative roots. 

But this is only half an answer. It may be, as in the examples above (the plight of young prisoners and married soldiers) that the evidence consolidates heavily in favour of a particular account of their behaviour. But why have we selected those groups and those behaviours out for attention? Prisoners and prisoner regimes come in all shapes and forms. Stouffer’s survey was already monumental before Merton began to excavate. So if interesting, puzzling and even unexpected uniformities are the starting point, there is a problem because the social world is an intriguing place and supplies such patterns by the million. What is more, Stinchcombe’s problem, which I’ve used as a stick to beat the other models, surely applies with a vengeance to the generative approach. That is to say, the argument is that any given uniformity will probably cede to three, four, more different explanations. So, however carefully one follows a particular explanatory path by teasing out its intricacies, the researcher is left with the possibility that other causal mechanisms may have played a part. Indeed, any sociologist who has difficulty in coming up with at least three mechanisms for any outcome pattern (why young prisoners benefit from education, why married draftees gripe etc.) should probably chose another profession. 

Let us move on swiftly by passing the modified Stinchcombe test in respect of the first puzzle. I have pursued a ‘shelter’ hypothesis above but it might be that: i) they young are more receptive mentally and pick up new ideas more readily ii) prison tutors favour them because they know the ropes of classroom conduct, iii) potential employers are more forgiving because they believe you can’t teach old dogs new tricks but that puppies can be forgiven. Note that these are all mechanisms; they describe the reasoning behind different courses of action and posit a potential outcome. Note also the point being conceded – mechanisms are a superabundant as variables. 

So how can mechanism analysis avoid the dread charge of description, of trading in one-off stories (albeit detailed, corroborated stories) about one-off occurrences? The solution is illustrated in figure 9, which I will explain in general terms before returning to drafted soldiers and then moving on the smoking bans, university fees, and TV digitisation.  The other formidable property of generative explanation is that it has memory. This occurs because generative mechanisms are theories, whilst variables and attributes are things. A mechanism is an account of why a demi-regularity turns out as it does. A mechanism is a proposition inhabited with concepts positing how constrained collective choices lead to an outcome pattern. Because it is hewn conceptually, that account has the precious property of abstraction.





















The prize here is that we have a tool that permits generalisation. Abstract conceptual frameworks are the source of transferable lessons. A fruitful theory will harness together and elucidate many different empirical instances. The same explanation may be located and relocated. Sociological reasoning matures in a process of harvesting seemingly diverse forms of social behaviour. Researchers find themselves thinking, ‘this conceptual scheme, which has already succeeded in explaining a particular of empirical phenomena might well be fit for purpose in explaining this new problem I am about to confront, and my work in turn might open up further compatible cases.’

Let us follow though the explanatory schema in figure 7 with an example. The ‘initial’ demi-reg identified different levels of dissatisfaction with the draft between married and unmarred soldiers in 40s USA. The generative explanation conjectured that this was a matter of relative deprivation, comparisons with pertinent reference groups were considered to have brought about the balance of sentiments uncovered in the research. Now, the gripes of servicemen from two generations ago hardly merit a flicker of sociological interest but that explanatory ensemble is still fresh. The act of compulsion, any imposition of a new regime, will always divide members. And for illustration’s sake we can follow the causal mechanism onwards to some present day gripes.

Without doing the research, I imagine that smokers now banned from pubs are much more resentful of the new regulations than non-smoking pub-goers and smoking non-pub-goers. I imagine that prospective students (or rather their parents) are resentful of the imposition of university fees than those who are through the system. Middle-income families are probably more indignant that the rich, who hardly notice, or the poor, who have fee-waivers. And what about the compulsion involved in the removal of the analogue TV signal? I imagine that poor, 5-channel-content pensioners will have their blood pressure raised, whereas Sky digiboxers won’t even notice, and some parents, whose children gaze at soon-to-be defunct bedroom TVs, might be quietly, momentarily pleased. What is touched upon here might be called the ‘ah-ah, I’ve seen that before’ phenomenon – an important if somewhat unremarked facet in our propensity and ability to make causal inferences.

It must be emphasised, however, that much more is on offer in generative explanation that these wanderings down memory lane. The process I’m describing is not merely, conceptual anointment, where we flick though examples announcing that this is relative deprivation, that is relative deprivation, and so on. At each turn there is empirical research to be done. Recall that Merton insisted on improving Stouffer’s explanation by recommending a mini programme of research covering whether the draftees’ resentment was a felt experience, whether there was knowledge of existing custom and practice, whether there was knowledge of the number of people effected, whether the comparison was immediate and local or was directed the act of compulsion more generally.

Rather than my ‘imaginings’ above, one could conduct research into behaviour and attitudes under compulsion by reusing this empirical framework (on theses and several instances of legislative change). There is no expectation that the empirical outcomes would simple repeat themselves across the various instances (subtle changes in the demi-regs are signified in figure 9!). People make choices but don’t choose the choices open to them. The idea, accordingly, is that causal explanations build by hypothesising the contextual differences in the forms of compulsion, as in the examples above, and then building and refining the theory to account for subtle variations in the choices and preference on the ground.

Here then is major difference with the other justifications for the legitimacy of a causal inference and the climax of the case for the generative model. Apart from the advantage of being able to marshal a greater range of evidence derived from diverse study types, generative causal explanations create confidence because of their pedigree. Explanatory success in one field begets assurance in the next. This is, of course, Merton’s famous argument about the need for lateral thinking and the federation of empirical inquiry using middle-range explanatory schemes that are: ‘sufficiently abstract to deal with different spheres of social behaviour and social structure, so that they transcend sheer description or empirical generalisation’ (1967: 68).

No one has bettered his case for it and his examples of it:





I bring down the curtain with a simple boxed summary of the strengths and weakness of the three approaches to causality addressed in this paper. I also find time to correct a little white lie.

TO POLISH
	Successionism can deal with outcome patterns impeccably, minutely, comprehensively and will continue to provide the raw data to instigate casual analysis. The approach is mistaken, however, in the belief that adding multiple variables, indicators, mediators and moderators brings closure to causal explanations. Such ‘models’ merely describe outcome patterns in more detail. Succesionist research locates explanatory power with variables, which cannot portray the mechanisms and contexts that generate social behaviour. Such generative thinking is often smuggled in during interpretative asides. Lacking a systematic theoretical base for such analysis, however, causal models produces non-cumulative, post-hoc explanation.

	Configurationism provides understanding of how combinations of causal conditions give rise to change. It is able to show in great relief that small similarities and difference within a family of cases can lead to quite different outcomes and will thus continue provide the backbone of comparative analysis. It can, however, only describe simple binary outcome patterns. Moreover, since configurational research locates explanatory power with attributes and their combination, it cannot portray the mechanisms and contexts that generate social behaviour. Such generative thinking is often smuggled in during interpretative asides. Lacking a systematic theoretical base for such analysis, however, Boolean models produces non-cumulative, post-hoc explanation.

	Generativism is designed to utilise mechanisms and contexts to explain outcome patterns and so provides the most complete approach to causal explanation. Because explanation trades in peoples’ choices and societal constraint., it calls on the full repertoire of social research to provide supportive empirical data. As with the other methods, it struggles with complexity. But because theory carries the explanation, its component causal mechanisms and contexts have a measure of abstraction allowing them to be recycled and empirical inquiry to cumulate.

In truth, one needs a fair bit of empirical research nous to follow the methodological contest refereed here. Indeed, there will never be a final verdict on all these matters, because technical innovation will always shift the boundaries of the guiding principles described here. The analysis above is thus ‘for beginners’, only in the colloquial sense that it is offered as a ‘first throw’ in a renewed debate about causality in social research. It seems to me that this debate is in dire need of renewal because interest in causal explanation has now been left in the hands of a technically inclined minority. The majority has settled for an entirely descriptive function for empirical inquiry, with even sensible scholars falling for the lure of data and more data (Savage and Burrows, 2007). 

Admission over, I finally get around to offering some real advice for beginners. What is needed in research training is a much greater emphasis on the ‘why?’ question. If students start to think about any social uniformity that interests them and ask why it comes about, they should start automatically to think of generative mechanisms and the contexts that sustain it. And, in doing so, they will penetrate further into the subtleties of the apparent uniformity. I first came across this way of teaching causal thinking in 1968 in a book by Stinchcombe, in a passage to which I have repeatedly referred, in which he hold forth, in a most forthright way, on the fecundity of the sociological imagination:

‘I usually assign students in a theory class the following task: Choose any relation between two or more variables which you are interested in; invent at least three theories, not known to be false, which might explain these relations; choosing appropriate indicators, derive at least three empirical consequences from each theory, such that the factual consequences distinguish among the theories. This I take to be the model of social theorizing as a practical scientific activity. A student who has difficulty thinking of at least three sensible explanations for any correlation that he is interested in should probably choose another profession.’ Stinchcombe (1968: 13) 

Forty years later, via the following examples, I offer the same challenge to the newcomers (male and female): 

	Given that interest in religion often declines with economic development, why is the religious adherence is notably high in the US?
	Why has property inflation outstripped the price rises for all other commodities in the UK in the last twenty years?
	In armed conflict between nations, why doesn’t victory to the greater power always follow when there is a large asymmetry of military might between combatants?
	Why has the gender gap in educational attainment been reversed in recent decades, with girls outperforming boys in most formal examinations?
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The ‘demi-regs’ of study two.
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